Israel imposes Lebanon blockade
Is this the beginning of the next war in the Middle East, as Yossi Klein Halevi of The New Republic believes?
The first stage of the war started two weeks ago, with the Israeli incursion into Gaza in response to the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and the ongoing shelling of Israeli towns and kibbutzim; now, with Hezbollah’s latest attack, the war has spread to southern Lebanon. Ultimately, though, Israel’s antagonists won’t be Hamas and Hezbollah but their patrons, Iran and Syria. The war will go on for months, perhaps several years. There may be lulls in the fighting, perhaps even temporary agreements and prisoner exchanges. But those periods of calm will be mere respites.
Any conflict between Israel and Iran/Syria via their terrorist proxies; Hezbollah and Hamas, has a better than even chance of widening into a regional war, especially during the first few days of the conflict. After a few days or a week, a narrative of sorts will establish itself in the minds of leaders on each side of the conflict, giving them a set of facts to base decisions upon. Whether or not those decisions will be rational is anyone’s guess, but the danger of a wider war will be less once a narrative thread along the lines of “Israel’s aim is to recover their kidnapped soldiers and destroy Hezbollah’s fortifications in the south of Lebanon” has established itself in the minds of the participants.
Prior to that, the fog of war, the fluid nature of modern warfare, and the number of potential adversaries crammed into what is after all a fairly small area of the Earth’s surface raises the very real danger that one or more key decision makers will misinterpret one development or another and apprehend a narrative of the conflict that would be obviously incorrect if there were a more developed pool of data available.
Or, as Chester says
At least three groups, Israel, Hamas, Hizbollah, and possibly a fourth, the Lebanese military, are now involved. From that stew, an event might emerge that like it or not would force a widening of the conflict by one side or another or an entry by Iran or Syria.
An event like this one, perhaps.
Israel has information that Lebanese guerrillas who captured two Israeli soldiers are trying to transfer them to Iran, Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev said Thursday.
That story is not good news for anyone trying to damp down the conflagration, though if true it provides a good explanation of why Israel is bombing bridges and transport centers. The harder it is to move around in southern Lebanon, the harder it is to smuggle out the captured soldiers.
Presuming that the incursion into Lebanon is indeed the beginning of a wider war, the key to Israeli success and thus U.S. success, for we are allies*, and facing a common enemy, will be control of the narrative, and the shorter the narrative, the better. Certainly the Israelis will have learned from their own experiences over the years, and the Iraq war has provided some sterling examples of what happens when a short, victorious war becomes a tedious, slogging occupation.
Control of when the narrative changes would also be a great help, as it grants tactical surprise. If Bashar al-Assad believes that “Israel is clearing out Hezbollah outposts in the Bekaa Valley“, it will come as a great surprise when the story becomes “Israeli forces in the Bekaa Valley are advancing into Syria down the Beirut-Damascus road.”**
It would be very helpful of Assad to flee Damascus at that point, providing us with the gratifying example (as well as another powerful narrative thread) of another Arab leader leaving a historic capitol defenseless before an army of the West, but though such behavior can probably be expected, it’s not best to count on it.
Historically, Damascus has been the key to Syria, as well as to Palestine. There’s a school of thought that says if the First Crusade has concentrated on capturing it, rather than Jerusalem, then the Crusader kingdoms would not have fallen later, as it provided the defending Muslims with a base from which to conduct raids and disrupt crusader supply lines. Capturing it, or simply driving the Syrian leadership from it, should put an end to the hot part of a shooting war.
Afterwards, of course, is where control of the narrative becomes most difficult. The Arab reaction to an extended Israeli occupation of Damascus would make the American experience in Iraq look like an afternoon tea. Ideally, the policing and protection of the country would be handed over to a friendly third party with experience in the area, and the Israeli troops could withdraw.
There’s really only one solution at that point. Get Turkey to take over the occupation, and bring back the Ottomans.
*Despite the self-evident need for our actions on behalf of Israel to be as under the table as possible, given the tetchy nature of the Arab, I suspect we will happily shoot down anything over flying Iraq on its way to Jerusalem from Iran, be it missiles or airplanes, and confine the rest of our aid to intelligence sharing. Israel can handle Syria’s ground forces on its own, and it would be a miracle if Iran managed to put even a battalion of troops on the ground in Syria, unless they’ve already done so
The Lebanese Tourism Ministry’s Research Center announced an amazing statistic in early July: in the first six months of the year, 60,888 Iranian tourists visited Lebanon. No other Asian country came close (the Philippines ranked second, with a bit over 12,000)..
**Yes, one might expect the Israel army to descend from the Golan Heights, as did the British in 1918, rather than taking the trouble to drive north in to the hornet’s nest of the Bekaa, then east, but there’s the small matter of U.N. Troops between them and Syria, and I doubt it would be helpful to the overall narrative if Israel is seen as disrespecting the baby blues, despite the U.N.’s historic mistreatment of Israel..
There are two other historic ways for an army to advance on Damascus, from the eastern desert, and from the North via the Homs Gap, but the first necessitates an invasion of Lebanon, and there’s little need to advance on Damascus from the north if one can do so from the west.