Let’s say you’re a member of the administrative board of your local non-profit, a board currently involved in the task of finding a manager to coordinate charitable giving in the community on the organization’s behalf. Furthermore, let’s say there’s a crack house down the street, and one of the residents has applied for the job.
Think you’d hire him? Would you trust him with your group’s money? What if he swore up and down that, though his friends and roommates were indeed deeply corrupted and heavily involved in the business of buying and selling drugs, he was an upstanding and law-abiding citizen? Would that make much of a difference in your feelings as to his fitness for the job?
If you’re like most people, the answer is “probably not.” If a job applicant comes from an environment where corruption is endemic, you’d be a fool to put him in a position where he has access to your money. You’d be asking for trouble.
So, is it really that much of a surprise to anyone that, under Ghana’s Kofi Annan and Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the U.N.’S Oil For Food Operation was little more than a giant skim operation?
Ghana may not be the most corrupt country in the world, but it’s not a place where anyone should feel comfortable opening a business either.
“Corruption indeed does occur in both the private and public spheres but it is particularly odious within the public sector because public officials are fiduciaries of the people, entrusted with the public purse,” the publication noted. “Furthermore, the government is a big player in business in Ghana, dominating many spheres of economic activity. Not surprisingly, the points of contact between the private and the public sectors are also the places most susceptible to corruption.”
The newsletter was dead-on when it stated, “Ghana’s corruption problem has deep roots in society and our political culture, where societal expectations of largesse and patronage from holders of public office combine with a culture of official impunity, low remuneration, and opacity and unregulated discretion in the use of public authority to produce a system that is hospitable to corruption. Nobody reasonably expects a government to turn this perennial problem around in its first term in office. Government, however, must at least acknowledge the gravity of the problem and assume appropriate responsibility as the elected government for finding effective and lasting remedies to the problem.”
You’d want to keep a sharp eye on the payroll clerk, as well.
A common form of public sector corruption in West Africa is the appearance of ?ghost names? on the civil service payroll. In Ghana, the deputy auditor-general disclosed in March 2002 that more than US $20 million had been paid to about 2,000 ghost names in the previous two years.25 In response, the finance minister ordered a headcount of civil servants; however, Ghana?s government faced growing criticism of its failure to address corruption within the civil service. In his inaugural address President John Kufuor promised to establish an ?office of accountability? under the direct supervision of the presidency that would oversee a code of conduct for public servants. Neither the office nor the code of conduct has yet been established.
Egypt is worse, despite the government’s attempts there to whitewash the problem.
The timing of the well-choreographed anti-corruption campaign is paramount. In the last 12 months, the nature of the campaign and its near-exclusive focus on senior officials in President Mubarak?s NDP, concurrent with the political rise of his son Gamal, has led to speculation that the crackdown is simply a prelude to his son?s increasingly public role.
The most striking feature of the campaign is that it is completely government-run and managed, lacking any input from NGOs and other civil society groups. Despite the administration?s rhetoric about forging coalitions to combat graft, the ?no to corruption? slogan is a government monopoly. Draconian press and NGO legislation strips civil society of the requisite autonomy and resources to expose corrupt officials.
…
Since the presidency stands at the centre of Egypt?s institutional structure, it controls the pace and direction of any corruption campaign ? which is why observers discount the efficacy of the current one. They interpret it as essentially a political project, a cover for shoving aside the old guard and paving the way for a new team of technocrats, headed by Mubarak?s son Gamal. At least one of the new appointments to head the corruption-ridden, public sector banks is a friend of the president?s son, himself a banker.
Let’s say you do hire the crack house applicant, and, inevitably, discover that a number of people have been skimming the profits from one of your group’s many projects, in this case the International Bake Sales for Peace. Among those implicated are the friends and associates of your former crack house denizen–for he has moved into a much finer residence–as well as his son.
Don’t you think that, just maybe, you should take a look at the rest of your group?s books?
